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This paper decomposes changes in poverty into growth and redistribution components, and 
employs several pro-poor growth concepts and indices to explore the growth, poverty and 
inequality nexus in Indonesia over the period 2002-2012. We find a ‘trickle-down’ situation, 
which the poor have received proportionately less benefits from growth than the non-poor. 
All pro-poor measures suggest that economic growth in Indonesia was particularly beneficial 
for those located at the top of the distribution. Regression-based decompositions suggest that 
variation in expenditure by education characteristics that persist after controlling for other 
factors to account for around two-fifths of total household expenditure inequality in 
Indonesia. If poverty reduction is one of the principal objectives of the Indonesian 
government, it is essential that policies designed to spur growth also take into account the 
possible impact of growth on inequality. These findings indicate the importance of a set of 
super pro-poor policies. Namely, policies that increase school enrolment and achievement, 
effective family planning programmes to reduce the birth rate and dependency load within 
poor households, facilitating urban-rural migration and labour mobility, connect leading and 
lagging regions and granting priorities for specific cohorts (such as children, elderly, 
illiterate, informal workers and agricultural households) in targeted interventions will serve to 
simultaneously stem rising inequality and accelerate the pace of economic growth and 
poverty reduction. 
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Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia with the world's fourth largest population, is 
at present using its strong economic growth to accelerate the rate of poverty reduction. 
Lately, however, in spite of the sustained economic growth, the rate of poverty reduction has 
begun to slow down, with inequality continuing to rise. Just over the past ten years, as 
poverty in Indonesia fell by 34 percent, the country’s Gini coefficient rose by around 30 
percent. The rising inequalities, attributed to changes in demographics, increased educational 
attainment and the transformation in the sectoral composition of growth away from 
agriculture and toward industry and services, are suspected to have dampened most of the 
poverty-reducing effects of growth. If unattended to, they can further result in forms of 
collective behaviour that impede economic growth, such as upsurges of social protests seen 
lately in Indonesia. Even if they do not result in violence, perceptions arising out of 
inequitable effects of policy reform can increase resistance and undermine the government’s 
ability to introduce the very important reforms needed for economic growth (Coudouel, Dani 
and Paternostro 2006). 
Indonesia is now facing the twin challenge of accelerating the rate of poverty reduction and at 
the same time adopting a pro-poor growth framework that allows the poor to benefit more 
from economic growth, and thereby curb rising inequalities. Policy planners in Indonesia now 
need to pay special attention to the large and growing inequality, since any attempt to 
discount the matter will polarise the society, lead to social tensions, and eventually, 
undermine the growth process itself. Setting targets for greater equity is, however, intricate 
and not straightforward; complexity should nonetheless not become a pretext for inertia in the 
face of one of the key development priorities for Indonesia. Thus in this context, it is 
particularly important to examine the nexus between growth, inequality and poverty in 
Indonesia from a dynamic perspective.  
It is has long been widely recognised that the poverty reduction effect of growth is strongly 
coupled with inequality (Jain and Tendulkar, 1990; McCulloch et.al. 2000; Datt and 
Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1997; Shorrocks, 1999). According to Ravallion (2004), the 
distribution-corrected rate of growth in average income will be given by initial equality times 
the rate of growth. For a given rate of growth, relatively more equal societies will have a 
higher distribution-corrected rate of growth. The impact on poverty from a given level of 
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growth will therefore be larger for higher rates of distribution-corrected growth. More recent 
studies (Ferreira et al. 2009; Fosu, 2009; Banerjee et al. 2005; World Bank, 2005:2008) have 
also shown that growing inequality reduces the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, and 
gives rise to poverty and inequality “traps” that have a detrimental influence on the growth 
prospects of an economy. 
Timmer (2004) investigated the growth process in Indonesia over the 1960-1990 period. His 
study found that during those three decades, the growth was instrumental in reducing poverty 
in Indonesia. It further showed how Indonesia has experienced both “relative” and “absolute” 
pro-poor growth, and concludes that throughout the study period, there have been no episodes 
in which the poor were absolutely worse off during sustained periods of economic growth. 
Further, Suryadarma, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2005) showed that high inequality reduced 
growth elasticity of poverty in Indonesia over the 1999-2002 time period. They found that 
poverty reduction between 1999 and 2002 was very successful due to inequality in 1999 
being at its lowest level in 15 years, thus leading to an increased impact of growth on poverty 
reduction. In another study, Suryahadi, Suryadarma and Sumarto (2009) further examined the 
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction by breaking down growth and 
poverty into their sectoral compositions and geographical locations. They find that the most 
effective way to accelerate poverty reduction is by focusing on rural agriculture and urban 
services growth. Subsequently, Sumarto and Bazzi (2011) found inequality in Indonesia to be 
historically low relative to other developing countries in Asia and Latin America with large 
targeted social programmes. They argue that targeting the poor and near-poor is difficult in 
countries with relatively lower inequality, since the distinctions between poor and non-poor 
tend to be less sharp, particularly given the clustering of households around the poverty line. 
Finally, Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja and Sumarto (2012) assess the relationship between 
economic growth and poverty reduction before and after the financial crisis in Indonesia. 
They find that growth in the service sector is the largest contributor to poverty reduction, and 
that the importance of agriculture sector growth for poverty reduction is confined only to the 
rural sector. 
Though there is a wealth of studies on the analysis of poverty and inequality in Indonesia, 
there is a dearth of micro-econometric literature on recent pro-poor growth, including 
regression-based redistribution decompositions. The objective of this paper is thus to conduct 
a micro-level dynamic analysis of the poverty-growth-inequality triangle in Indonesia. First, 
this paper attempts to answer the question of how much of the decline in poverty over the 
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2002-2012 period is imputable to changes in mean income and inequality, and to what extent 
it can be said that growth has been pro-poor. Secondly, the study attempts to understand the 
link between different socio-economic characteristics and total inequality. Specifically, it 
seeks to assess to what extent returns to education brought about by Indonesia’s global 
integration and labour market reforms contributed to total consumption inequality, after 
controlling for the household characteristics such as age, size, structure, industry, 
employment and regional characteristics that could potentially affect welfare. The analysis in 
the paper is based on two nationally representative socio-economic household surveys 
(Susenas) over the period 2002-2012, using national poverty lines.  
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2.	  Poverty	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Indonesia:	  Initial	  Conditions	  
 
Poverty	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Indonesia	  in	  the	  regional	  context	  
The remarkable success in tackling poverty in East Asia and the Pacific during the past three 
decades has been associated with an increase in income inequality in several countries in this 
region. Table 1. Regional Poverty and Inequality gives the regional poverty and inequality 
profile. According to ADB (2012), several countries in the Asia and Pacific region (such as 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, 
and Viet Nam) were able to achieve a reduction in poverty incidence of more than 30 
percentage points within the last three decades. At the same time, inequality has increased 
most dramatically in China but has also risen in several other countries such as Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia, at a time when it had been trending downward in many 
Latin American countries (Figure 1. Change in Inequality, Regional Profile). The Gini 
coefficient, which measures inequality, recorded new highs of 48.2 percent in China, 45 
percent in the Philippines and 40 percent in Thailand, all of which are higher rates than those 
that prevail in most countries in Eastern Europe and South Asia. Considering the Asia Pacific 
region as a whole, the Gini coefficient has leapt from 39 to 46 in the last two decades (ADB 
2012). Income inequality, as measured by the ratio of income or consumption of the highest 
quintiles to the lowest ones, also deteriorated in almost half of 30 developing Asian 
economies, worsening for four of the five most populous countries in the region — 
Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, and Indonesia during the last three 
decades (ADB 2012). 
 
Poverty	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Indonesia	  
Indonesia has made remarkable strides in tackling poverty over the last 30 years, despite 
some impediments, such as the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s. Three decades of 
sustained growth enabled the Indonesian economy to transform from a poor, largely rural 
society to a dynamic, industrialising one. Maturing democracy, rapid political reforms, 
assortment of economic policy packages and the creation of conducive economic and 
institutional environments have generated this sustainable economic growth. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, Indonesia is thus perceived to be a model of successful 
economic development in South East Asia.  The period from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s 
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can be deemed as one of the most successful episodes in terms of eradicating poverty, with its 
incidence declining by three-fold; between 1976 and 1993, poverty declined from 44 percent 
to 13 percent. Since 1999, poverty headcount index, as measured by the national poverty line, 
has fallen further in Indonesia.  
The period of steady poverty reduction was disrupted by the East Asian crisis, which began 
July 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai Baht. It was transmitted rapidly to Indonesia with 
a speculative currency attack on the Indonesian Rupiah. Immediately in August 2007, the 
Rupiah collapsed and inflation soared, with food prices outpacing general headline prices. A 
social and economic crisis exploded then into a political one, with the then President Suharto 
eventually being thrown out of power by mid-1998. By 1998, Indonesia had suffered a multi-
dimensional economic and political crisis, triggering the poverty rate to increase from 17 
percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 1999. During this period, other socio-economic indicators, 
such as schooling dropout rate, were also suspected to have increased. However, by 2004 the 
poverty incidence has been able bounce back again to below pre-crisis levels, at less than 17 
percent of the population (Figure 2. Number and Percentage of Poor People in Indonesia). 
Later, in 2006, poverty increased again, with the headcount index rising to 17.75 percent 
from 15.97 percent in the previous year. This time it was primarily due to the government’s 
policy decision to increase the domestic price of fuel by an average of around 120 percent, 
and to a sharp increase in the price of rice between February 2005 and March 2006. More 
recently, in spite of the sustained economic growth, the rate of poverty reduction has begun to 
slow down. The main reason for this is thought to be the changing nature of poverty. As the 
poverty incidence approaches a single digit figure and is around ten percent, further 
reductions in poverty become increasingly more difficult. When the poverty incidence was in 
mid-twenties, a large number of households used to live just below the poverty line and hence 
only a slight increase in income was needed to push those households out of poverty. But 
now the nature of poverty has changed: many households live far below the poverty line and 
others are clustered just above it, with the risk of falling back to poverty (Suryahadi et al., 
2011). 
Three salient features can thus characterise poverty in contemporary Indonesia. Firstly, large 
numbers of households are clustered around the national income poverty line, thus rendering 
many non-poor vulnerable to poverty. It is estimated that almost half Indonesia’s population 
still lives on less than IDR.15,000 per day, and as a result, is susceptible to falling into 
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poverty in case of small shocks. Households churning in and out of poverty are thus a very 
common phenomenon in Indonesia; evidence from panel data suggests that during 2007-
2009, more than half of poor in a given year were not poor the previous year. Secondly, the 
income and monetary poverty measures do not always capture the true picture of poverty in 
Indonesia; many households who may not be “income poor” could be categorised as 
multidimensional poor due to lack of access to basic services, employment, education and 
poor development outcomes. Thirdly, given the vast size of and heterogeneous nature of 
Indonesian geography, regional disparities are also an entrenched feature of poverty in the 
country. Indonesia now has 34 provinces, eight of which have been created since 1999. 
Welfare disparities are significant across these 34 provinces in Indonesia, and national 
averages mask stark differences. For example, the poverty incidence in some of the outlying 
provinces such as Papua was as high as 31 percent of the population, as compared to 3.7 in 
Jakarta in 2012. 
The growing inequality in Indonesia is depicted in Figure 3. Gini and Expenditure Shares, 
which shows the movements in the expenditure shares and Gini over the 1993-2012 period. 
During the period prior to the Asian economic crisis (1993-1996), the Gini index increased as 
a whole from 0.34 to 0.36. It then dropped to a low of 0.31 in 1999, probably due to the fact 
that the crisis had hit high-income households disproportionately harder and this resulted in 
the narrowing of the income gap (Said and Widyanti, 2002). This influence could have been 
transmitted through large shifts in relative prices that may have benefited those in the rural 
economy relative to those in the urban-formal economy (Remy & Tjiptoherijanto 2001). 
Subsequently, there was some relative constancy of the Gini until 2004, and a brief hike of 
the index resulting from the fuel price increase of 2005. Yet since 2006, inequality in 
Indonesia has been steadily increasing, as exhibited by the constant rise in the Gini index up 
to 2012. It can be thus said that although the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s subdued 
social inequalities, in its aftermath they have been on the rise. These changes are reflected in 
the movements of household expenditure shares; the consumption share of the bottom 40 
percent of Indonesian households decreased form 19.8 percent in 2006 to 16.9 percent in 
2012. On the other hand, the consumption shares enjoyed by the top 20 percent increased 
from 42 percent in 2006 to 49 percent in 2012. These changes suggest that a massive 
regressive redistribution of income from the great majority of the population to a very small 
elite has occurred in recent years. 
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Table 2. Regional Socio-Economic Indicators shows the regional output shares in Indonesia 
together with poverty, inequality and human development indices. Vast disparities that exist 
between provinces become evident, with provincial income shares varying from 0.1 percent 
to 16 percent. The Capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, and other resource abundant provinces, such 
as Riau and East Kalimantan, have remarkably high income shares. It can be also seen that 
although rates of poverty vary across and within all regions, provinces with low-income 
shares are mostly in the eastern part of the country. A worrisome feature to note from Table 
2. Regional Socio-Economic Indicators is that some western provinces simultaneously 
exhibit large income shares and high poverty rates.  
A widely accepted explanation for the regional output differences is the availability of natural 
resource prohibitive traffic and high cost of trade among provinces. A more conceivable 
factor, which is getting broad attention lately, is the structural change that Indonesia has 
experienced in the past two decades. While the GDP share of agriculture was more than 20 
percent in the 1980s, it declined to 15 percent in mid-2000. Meanwhile, the GDP share of the 
manufacturing sector rose from 16 percent to 26 percent. The trade structure went through an 
even more radical change as the mining industry lost its dominance of exports. By 2005, the 
GDP share of non-mining exports amounted to almost 70 percent of total exports. 
Industrialisation is heavily concentrated, however, in the Greater Jakarta area and export 
processing zones of Riau Islands. The rising contribution of manufactured goods to the export 
mix, as opposed to export of such lower-value-added materials as raw lumber and mining ore, 
thus led to a rapid increase in the GDP per capita in the regions where major investment has 




3.	  Analytical	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  	  
 
Growth-redistribution decompositions and indices of pro-poorness based on the 
methodologies of Datt and Ravallion (1992), Ravallion and Chen (2003), Kakwani and 
Pernia (2000), Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003) will be primarily be used to examine the 
dynamics of pro-poor growth in this study. Two different poverty measures that make up the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class were utilised to capture the different dimensions of 
poverty. The FGT indices combine expenditure and the poverty line in to poverty gaps (PG), 
and aggregate these gaps to evaluate the extent of poverty. The FGT poverty index can be 
expressed as: 
𝑃 𝑧:𝛼 = 𝑧 − 𝑄∗ 𝑝: 𝑧 !𝑑𝑝!!  
Expenditure censored2 at the poverty line Z, is given by Q∗ p: z . Thus, the poverty gap at 
percentile p is g p; z = z − Q∗(p: z). When α = 0, the FGT index reduces to the simple 
headcount poverty (PH) measure. Poverty headcount is the share of population with 
expenditure falling below the poverty line. The average poverty gap is when p z: α = 1 ,  and 
is the average extra consumption that would be required to bring each poor household up to 
the poverty line. 
The FGT index will be used in this study for both the sectoral and source/component 
decomposition of poverty. Variables X and Y will be used interchangeably to denote real per 
capita expenditure that captures the living standard, while Q(p) will be the living standard 
level below which we find a proportion of p of the population. The sectoral decomposition of 
poverty by population subgroups/sectors is done by dividing the population in to K mutually 
exclusive population subgroups and expressing the FGT index as following: 
𝑝 𝑧:𝛼 = 𝜙 𝑘 𝑃 𝑘: 𝑧:𝛼!!  
Where K is the number of population subgroups, p k: z: α  is the estimated FGT index of 
subgroup k, ϕ k  is the estimated population share of subgroup k, ϕ k P k: z: α  is the 
estimated absolute contribution of subgroup k to total poverty, and ϕ k P k: z: α /P(z: α) is 
                                                
2 It means expenditure of household living below the poverty line. 
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the estimated relative contribution of subgroup. Decomposing poverty by subgroups/sectors 
means that an improvement in one of the subgroups while holding the incomes of the other 
groups will always improve aggregate poverty. In other words, an independent assessment 
can be done in the optimal design of social safety nets and benefit targeting within any given 
subgroup/sector regardless of any other income distributions in other groups. Thus any 
successful targeting that reduces poverty at the local level implies that poverty at the 
aggregate level should have also decreased. 
The scientific and policy community often tends to define growth pro-poorness based on both 
absolute and relative approaches. In the absolute approach, growth is defined as pro-poor if 
there is a reduction in absolute poverty with incomes of the poor rising fast enough to reduce 
the number of people living below a reference poverty line. The relative approach is based on 
the notion of whether the incomes of the poor are rising relative to the incomes of the non-
poor and hence a decline in inequality. Thus this approach focuses attention on whether the 
poor are benefiting more or less proportionately from growth and whether inequality, a key 
determinant of the extent to which growth reduces poverty, is rising or falling over time. Both 
the relative and absolute concepts of pro-poor growth are equally important, and complement 
each other in the analysis of growth processes from a pro-poor standpoint. Therefore it is vital 
that policy planners distinguish between growth that changes the incomes of the poor either 
by a positive absolute amount (for absolute poverty) and growth that changes the incomes of 
the poor by the same proportional amount as in the rest of the population (for relative poverty 
and/or relative inequality). 
Decomposition of observed changes in poverty between 2002 and 2012 into growth and 
redistributive components will be based on the methodology of Datt and Ravallion (1992). 
The change in poverty between 2002 (t-1) and 2012 (t) can be expressed as: 
𝑃! 𝑧;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼 = 𝑃!!! 𝑧𝜇!!!𝜇! ;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼!"#$%!  !""!#$ + 𝑃!
𝑧𝜇!𝜇!!! ;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼!"#$%&'$()&$*+  !""!#$ +   𝜀 P z; α  is the normalised FGT index, µμ is mean expenditure and z is the poverty line. P!!! !!!!!!! ; α  is the level of poverty in 2002 after its expenditures have been scaled by µμ! µμ!!! to yield a distribution with mean µμ! while holding inequality constant. The growth 
effect term is simply the difference between the two distributions with relative expenditure 
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being equal over the period of analysis. The growth term is negative when µμ! > µμ!!!,, 
suggesting that growth reduces poverty. Similarly, P! !!!!!!! ; α  is the level of poverty in 2012 
after its expenditures have been scaled by µμ!!! µμ! to yield a distribution with mean µμ!!!. The 
redistribution effect term is the difference between the two distributions with equal mean 
expenditures, but different relative expenditure shares. The error term is given by: 
𝑃! 𝑧;𝛼 + 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼 − 𝑃! 𝑧𝜇!𝜇!!! ;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧𝜇!!!𝜇! ;𝛼  
The error term yields either the difference between the growth effect when using 2012 (t) and 
2002 (t-1) interchangeably as reference distributions. Therefore given the path dependence, 
the error term can be made to disappear by averaging the components (i.e. Shapley 
decomposition), which can be expressed as: 
𝑃! 𝑧;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼= 𝑃!!! 𝑧𝜇!!!𝜇! ;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼 + 𝑃! 𝑧;𝛼 − 𝑃! 𝑧𝜇!𝜇!!! ;𝛼
+ 𝑃! 𝑧𝜇!𝜇!!! ;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧;𝛼 + 𝑃! 𝑧;𝛼 − 𝑃!!! 𝑧𝜇!!!𝜇! ;𝛼  
The first pro-poorness measure is the ‘poverty equivalent growth rate’ proposed by Kakwani 
and Pernia (2000); Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003); Kakwani, and Son (2008),   which 
identifies positive growth as pro-poor if the poor benefits proportionately more than the non-
poor. The measure is derived from a general class of additively decomposable income-
poverty measures which, for a given poverty line, z, can be expressed as: 
𝜃 = 𝑃 𝑧, 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦!!    
where P z, y  is an individual poverty function homogeneous of degree zero in both 
arguments, and f(y) is the density function of consumption. The growth elasticity of poverty 
is defined as the ratio of the proportional change in poverty to the proportional change in the 
mean consumption, and is given by: 
𝛿 = 𝑑 ln 𝜃 𝛾 = 1𝜃𝛾 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑦!! 𝑦 𝑝 𝑔 𝑝 𝑑𝑝 
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where γ = d ln( µμ) is the growth rate of mean income and g p = d ln(x p ) is the growth rate 
of the consumption of people at p-th percentile. Thus δ is the percentage change in poverty 
headcount resulting from a growth rate of one percent in the mean consumption and is always 
negative. Next, the growth elasticity of poverty is decomposed in to two components as: 
𝛿 = 𝜂 + 𝜁 
where η = !! !"!" y p dp!!  is distribution neutral relative growth elasticity of poverty derived 
by Kakwani (1993), and ζ = !!" !!!!!! x p d ln L! p dp is the first derivative of the Lorenz 
function  L(p) which measures the effect of inequality on poverty reduction.  Kakwani et al. 
(2004; 2008) defines the poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR)- γ∗, as the growth rate that 
will yield the same decrease in the poverty headcount as the actual present growth rate γ  if 
the growth process had a zero change in inequality (when everyone in the society had 
received the same proportional benefits of growth). The actual proportional rate of poverty 
reduction is equal to δγ, with 𝛿 being the total poverty elasticity. If the growth were 
distribution neutral (when inequality had not changed), then the growth rate γ∗  would result 
in a proportional reduction in poverty equal to ηγ∗, which should be equal to δγ. Thus, the 
(PEGR)- γ∗, can be expressed as: 
𝛾∗ = 𝛿𝜂 𝛾 = 𝜙𝛾 
Where ϕ = δ η is the pro-poor index derived by Kakwani and Pernia (2000). According to 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), growth will be pro-poor if ϕ > 1, implying that the poor benefit 
proportionately more than the non-poor. Thus in this case the growth process occurs with 
redistribution in favour of the poor. When 0 < 𝜙 < 1, growth cannot be deemed strictly pro-
poor (due to growth taking place with redistribution adversely affecting the poor) even 
though there is reduction in the poverty headcount. If  𝜙 < 0, economic growth will lead to 
rise in the poverty incidence. Similarly for the PEGR index, growth will be pro-poor (anti-
poor) if 𝛾∗ is greater (less) than 𝛾. When 0 < γ∗ < 𝛾, the growth process results in an 
increasing inequality but the poverty incidence falling. Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003) 
define this situation as a ‘trickle-down’ in which the poor receive proportionately less benefit 
from growth than the non-poor. It is also possible for (PEGR)- γ∗ to be negative with  
positive economic growth leading to a rise in the poverty. This situation is similar to what 
Bhagwati (1988) defines as “immiserising” growth. This situation can arise when inequality 
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increases to such an extent that the positive effects of growth are more than offset by the 
adverse impact of rising inequality. 
Secondly, the growth incidence curve (GIC) proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003) based 
on the anonymity or symmetry axiom will be used for the measurement of pro-poorness. 
Growth incidence curve plots the cumulative share of the population against income growth 
of the ξ-th quintile when income is ranked in ascending order. GIC can be expressed as: 
𝑔! 𝜉 = 𝑦!(𝜉)𝑦!!!(𝜉) − 1 = 𝜇!𝜇!!! ∙ 𝐿!′ 𝜉𝐿!!!′ 𝜉 − 1 
where L′ ξ  is the slope of the Lorenz at the ξ-th quantile with mean income of µμ.  If g! ξ   is a 
decreasing (increasing) function for all ξ then inequality falls (rises) overtime for all 
inequality measures satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. First order dominance of 
the distribution is then attained when g! ξ > 0  for all percentiles with the entire growth 
incidence curve being above zero. Ravallion and Chen (2003) also show that the area under 
the growth incidence curve up to the poverty headcount index H!!! (minus one times) gives 
the rate of change of the Watts index over time: 
𝑑𝑊!𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑 log 𝑦!(𝜉)𝑑𝑡!!!!! ∙ 𝑑𝜉 = 𝑔! 𝜉 ∙ 𝑑𝜉
!!!!
!  
According to Ravallion and Chen (2003), the rate of pro-poor growth is the actual growth rate 
multiplied by the ratio of the actual change in the Watts index to the change that would have 
occurred with the same growth rate but with no change in inequality (distribution neutral 
growth). The pro-poor growth (PPG) measure can then be defined by the mean growth rate of 
income of the poor and can be expressed as: 
PPG = 1H!!! g!(ξ) ⋅ dξ!!!!!  
Where H!!! is the poverty headcount in the first period. The rate of pro-poor growth is then 
the change in the Watts index divided by the poverty headcount of the first period. When PPG > 0 everywhere, the change is absolutely pro-poor and there is first order dominance 
over the initial distribution, with poverty falling for all poverty lines and measures within a 
broad class (Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988). If PPG index is greater than 
growth rate of the mean population income, then growth deemed relatively pro-poor as the 
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poor have benefited relatively more from growth than those above the poverty line. If the 
distributional shifts go against the poor, then the pro-poor growth index will be lower than the 
ordinary rate of growth. 
Regression-based inequality decomposition techniques of Fields (2003) and Morduch and 
Sicular (2002) will be finally employed to answer two different types of questions. Firstly, 
how much do various factors contribute overall inequality at any given point in time? 
Secondly, how much does each of these factors contribute to the difference in inequality 
between two time periods? 
Fields (2003) and Morduch and Sicular (2002) methods involve estimation of standard 
income generating equations written in terms of covariances. The contribution of the 
explanatory variables to the distributional changes is determined by the size of the coefficient 
and changes in the respective variable’s elasticity. Compared with the unconditional 
decomposition approaches, the regression-based approach provides an efficient and flexible 
way to quantify the conditional roles of demographic effects, education, employment, assets, 
infrastructure and spatial effects in a multivariate context.  
The regression-based decomposition methodology starts with an income or expenditure 
generating equation: 
ln 𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝜀!!!!!  
 ln 𝒀 = 𝑔(𝑿,𝜷, 𝜺) 
 
where 𝑿 is a vector of independent regressor variables capturing the exogenous determinants 
of expenditure such as household demographics, education, employment, assets, 
infrastructure and spatial dummies. 𝜷 is the vector of estimated regression coefficients and 𝜺 
is an n-vector of residuals. 
The sum of contributions 𝑆! 𝒀𝒌 , made by 𝐾 different expenditure components to some 
inequality index 𝐼 𝒀  measuring household expenditure dispersion can be expressed as: 
 
𝐼 𝒀 = 𝑆!(𝒀!)!!!!  
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This type of decomposition can answer the question: what proportion of total income 
inequality 𝐼 𝒀 , is explained by income factor 𝒀!? Shorrocks (1982) seminal paper shows 
that, given a set of desired decomposition properties and under several assumptions, there is a 
unique factor decomposition rule. This decomposition rule is independent of the inequality 
index used and defines the proportion of total inequality that is attributable to expenditure 
factor k in the following way: 
 𝑆! = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝒀,𝑿!𝜎! 𝒀  
 
Where 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝒀,𝑿!  is the covariance between total expenditure and expenditure from source 𝑘, and 𝜎! 𝒀  is the variance of total expenditure. Following this Shorrocks (1982) inequality 
decomposition by component sources, the regression estimates can then be used to construct 
the relative share of inequality attributed to component 𝑋! as: 
 𝑆! = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝛽!𝑋! , ln(𝑌)𝜎! ln(𝑌) = 𝛽!𝜎 𝑋!   𝑐𝑜𝑟 𝑋! , ln(𝑌)𝜎 ln(𝑌)  
 
Where 𝑆! can be interpreted as that share of inequality which can be attributed to the fact that 𝑋! is uniqually distributed across households , 𝛽! are the estimated coefficients, and 𝜎 𝑋!  
and 𝜎 ln(𝑌)  are the standard deviations respectively for the regressors and for the dependent 
variable (i.e. the estimated inequality of the income measure) and finally, the term 𝑐𝑜𝑟 𝑋! , ln(𝑌)  is the vector of the correlation indexes between regressors and the estimated 
dependent variable. Thus 𝑆! > 0 implies that factor 𝑘 is inequality-increasing,   𝑆! < 0 
means that factor 𝑘 is inequality-decreasing, whereas 𝑆! = 0 entails that factor 𝑘 is 
distributed as equal or unequal as total income. 
The intuitive appeal of the equality expression above is very straightforward and clear. It tells 
that 𝑆! is large if 1) 𝛽! is large, i.e. when 𝑋! is important for explaining income; 2) income 
factor 𝑋! has a large standard error relative to the standard error of expenditure, or 3) 
existence of a high correlation between 𝑋! and ln(𝑌). This approach is quit appealing due to 
its simplicity, exactness and being based on Shorrock’s (1982) axiomatically derived “natural 
decomposition and therefore being independent of which inequality measure one uses”. 
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Finally, the share of the contribution of a factor K to the change in overall inequality 
measured by any inequality index 𝐼(∙) over time can be written as: 
 ∏ 𝑘 = !!!!!!!!!!!!!! ,       ∏!𝐼(⋅)! =100% 
 
Therefore, Field’s decomposition can identify the share of contributing factors to both the 




4.	  Empirical	  Results	  
 
Between 2002 and 2012, the rate of poverty declined from 18.2 percent to 11.96 percent, 
corresponding to a fall in the number of people below the poverty line from 38.4 million to 
29.1 million (Table 3. Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 2002-2012). Simultaneously, the 
Gini index increased by 27 percent from 0.31 to 39 during the last ten year period (Table 3. 
Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 2002-2012 and Figure 3. Gini and Expenditure Shares). 
The consumption gap between the top and bottom fifths of families also increased 
substantially during the examined period; the bottom quintile accounted for around 9 percent 
of all consumption in 2002, which fell to 7.5 percent in 2012, while the share of income 
going to the top quintile rose from 40 percent in 2002 to 46.7 percent in 2012. This widening 
in income inequality gap can matter for many reasons and can have widespread 
consequences. For one, it potentially entrenches discrimination in other areas, such as access 
to education and health care. Additionally, other development indicators, such as child 
mortality or school enrolment, tend to improve more slowly than income and consumption 
measures of poverty. Secondly, exclusion exacerbates social and political tensions.  
Table 3. Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 2002-2012 also shows that the highest incidence 
of poverty was in the rural sector, followed by national and urban. Furthermore, during the 
2002-2012 period, the fall in the incidence of poverty in the urban sector was much higher 
than the decrease in rural and national poverty rate. These findings indicate that it is not in the 
sector where poverty was more prevalent that the poverty reduction took place between 2002 
and 2012. Poverty reduction policies that target rural areas thus emerge as the priority for the 
policy makers. 
The welfare status of poor Indonesian households can be also analysed through setting 
various poverty lines. Figure 4a. FGT Curve (alpha=0) and 4b. Difference between Figure 4b. 
FGT Curves (alpha=0) depicts how the difference in headcount between 2002 and 2012 
varies with their choice. The FGT poverty curve shows that the incidence of poverty at the 
official, IDR.248,707 poverty line in 2012 is 11.96 percent, while it is negligible is the 
poverty line were to be set at IDR.150,000. Pockets of poverty emerge and the headcount 
rises rapidly at poverty lines higher than around IDR.180,000, which also indicates that it is 
at this point that the Indonesian density of consumption starts being important. Finally, if we 
applied an IDR. 450,000 poverty line, 50 percent of the population would live below it. These 
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poverty headcount differences are statistically significant throughout the poverty lines 
between IDR.40,000 and IDR.200,000. The findings clearly show that the larger the poverty 
line, the greater the difference between the headcounts of the two years, which implies that in 
2012, for larger poverty lines, the poverty head-count was systematically lower than in 2002.
  
Figure 5. Difference Between 2012 and 2002 Lorenz Curves shows the difference between 
the 2012 and the 2002 Lorenz curves (and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals). It 
is evident from the graph that inequality deteriorated significantly between 2002 and 2012. In 
2012, the bottom 20 percent of the Indonesian population enjoyed around eight percent of 
total consumption, while the top 20 percent was responsible for around 47 percent. The 
bottom 20 percent of the population lost approximately 1.5 percent of total national 
consumption between 2002 and 2012 (a 15 percent decrease in their respective share), while 
the top 20 percent of the population has seen its share in total consumption rise by six percent 
in just ten years (a 15 percent increase in their respective share).  
The interaction between growth and inequality is depicted in detail in Table 4. Growth – 
Redistribution Decompositions, Indonesia 2002-2012, which decomposes the change in 
Indonesia’s headcount poverty between 2002 and 2012 in terms of the effect of growth and 
changes in inequality. During 2002-2012 period, the total change in poverty has been 
statistically significant and influenced by both growth and income redistribution. The positive 
sign on the redistribution component indicates a negative impact on poverty reduction due to 
worsening inequality. Growth reduced poverty by around 17.5 percentage points, but this 
reduction was offset by an increase in inequality by 11.38 percentage points. The 
redistribution effect has thus cancelled out the growth effect by more than one half during 
period 2002 to 2012.  The fall in poverty between 2002 and 2012 would have been roughly 
17 percentage points lower, had it not been for the increase in inequality. Hence, the 
aggravation of inequality in Indonesia during this ten-year period reduced the effect of 
growth on poverty reduction. Similarly, for both urban and rural sectors, average 
consumption has increased significantly, but strong adverse redistribution effects have 
cancelled out almost half of the positive effects of growth on poverty. Table A1. Growth – 
Redistribution Decompositions, Indonesia 2006-2012 also shows that both growth and 
redistribution effects to have significantly influenced the changes in poverty during the 2006-
2012 period. 
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Table 5. Pro-Poor Indices for Indonesia, 2002-2012 provides estimates and confidence 
intervals for Indonesia’s 2002-2012 growth rate (denoted by the variable - g), and also for the 
three different pro-poor indices: Ravallion and Chen (2003) index, Kakwani, Khandker and 
Son (2003) - poverty-equivalent growth (PEGR) rate index, and the Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000) index. All of the three indices of absolute pro-poorness are statistically greater than 
zero; this means that the change from 2002 to 2012 has decreased absolute poverty. The 
Ravallion and Chen-PPG > 0, and the changes during 2002-2012 are absolutely pro-poor, but 
have first order dominance over the initial distribution. However, since the PPG index is less 
than the growth rate of the mean population income, growth during the 2002-2012 period 
cannot be deemed relatively pro-poor, as the distributional shifts have gone against the poor. 
The PEGR index is greater than zero, but less than mean growth in population income, and 
thus characterises a ‘trickle-down’ situation (Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003)) in which 
the poor have received proportionately less benefit from growth than the non-poor. So it is 
clearly evident from the PEGR that over the 2002-2012 period, growth reduced poverty, but 
has been accompanied by increasing inequality. Alternatively, it can be seen that the 
estimates of Ravallion and Chen (2003) PPG-index minus g and of Kakwani, Khandker and 
Son (2003) PEGR-index minus g are all negative, indicating that growth has not been 
relatively pro-poor. Thus it can be inferred that the growth rates of the incomes of the poor 
have not been high enough to follow the growth rate in average income, and their relative 
shares in total consumption have decreased during the 2002-2012 period. Similarly, during 
the 2006-2012 period, all pro-poor indices display the same growth trend, with the 
distributional shifts working against the poor (Table A2. Pro-Poor Indices for Indonesia, 
2006-2012). 
Figure 6. Growth Incidence Curve gives shows the distributive impact of growth between 
2002 and 2012 using the growth incidence curve.  According to Figure 6. Growth Incidence 
Curve, the absolute change in expenditure is everywhere statistically positive, indicating that 
growth has been absolutely pro-poor throughout the entire distribution. The growth incidence 
curve shows there is first order dominance, which implies that poverty has fallen no matter 
where one draws the poverty line or what poverty measure one uses within a broad class 
(Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988). The growth incidence curve also shows that in 
reality, very few households moved up along with the average growth rate of the economy. In 
fact, growth in consumption was very modest for the households in 10th percentile, while the 
very top 90th percentile experienced a significant increase in consumption. Consumption at 
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the 10th percentile has increased only by around ten percent (average annual increase of one 
percent), whereas consumption at the 90th percentile had a 50 percent increase (average 
annual increase of five percent) during the 2002-2012 period. The slope of the growth 
incidence curve, and specifically its steepness and upward direction, imply that in general 
growth has been accompanied by rise in inequality over the 2002-2012 period due the rate of 
income growth of individuals in the upper income percentiles being higher than the income 
growth rate of the poor.  
Additionally, the proportional changes3 relative to the growth rate in mean consumption also 
vary significantly across percentiles. As reported in Table 5. Pro-Poor Indices for Indonesia, 
2002-2012, the mean growth in consumption is around 38 percent, which evidently exceeds 
the growth rates experienced by most Indonesians. Except for the top quintile, households in 
the bottom four quintiles experienced below average growth rates of consumption. This 
evidence of inequality levels increasing substantially between 2002 and 2012 is also 
consistent with the fact that growth rates have not been roughly proportional across 
percentiles. 
Table 6. Regression-based Inequality Decompositions – 2012 and Table 7. Regression-based 
Inequality Decompositions – 2002 provide the semi-log regression results and quantify the 
importance of various factors that have contributed to total in inequality in Indonesia during 
the 2002-2012-time period. The first column of each table gives the coefficients from a linear 
expenditure equation estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on the full sample of 
households, while the second column gives standard errors. All estimated coefficients are 
highly statistically significant with the expected signs. The tables show that per-capita 
expenditures decrease with number of household members and increase with age. The tables 
also show that expenditures are higher for urban and non-agricultural households, and that 
education raises expenditures, increasingly so for higher levels of education. 
Next, the inequality decomposition results answers the two questions of Fields (1998) and 
Morduch and Sicular (2002) in their proposed decomposition methodologies. First, given an 
expenditure generating function estimated by a standard semi-logarithmic regression, how 
much consumption inequality is accounted for by each explanatory factor? Second, how 
much of the difference in income inequality between one date and another is accounted for by 
education, by potential employment characteristics, and by the other explanatory factors? In 
                                                
3 Since pro-poor growth is a dynamic analysis, the change happens overtime. 
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particular, policy makers would like to know whether observed changes in inequality 
between two periods of time are due to changes in the returns to factors (e.g. education) or to 
changes in the distribution of factors of production  (for example due to changes in 
demographic characteristics). 
Figure 6. Growth Incidence Curve and column 3 of Tables 6. Regression-based inequality 
decompositions – 2012 and Table 7. Regression-based Inequality Decompositions – 2002 
answers the above questions and summarises the overall group (demographic, education, 
employment and spatial-regional characteristics) contributions to total inequality for 2002 
and 2012. It is clearly evident that differences in education, demographics, geographic 
location and employment have contributed significantly to total inequality. However, the 
differentials in expenditure by education level have been relatively larger than for other 
factors. Theoretically, higher education inequality should be associated with higher income 
inequality, as a higher educational level should duly ensure a higher income. Thus, 
differences in educational achievements imply differences in the ability to earn income and 
consequently disparities in expenditure. During both 2002 and 2012, education differences in 
expenditure have contributed substantially (37 percent on average) to overall inequality, 
suggesting that education policies have substantially more redistributive impacts. It is also 
important to note that primary education has an equalising effect on poverty. This is 
understandable, since those who are poor are most often educated only up to primary level. 
To enhance this welfare equalising effect, policy initiatives are needed to increase the returns 
and attainment of primary education among the poor. 
For both 2002 and 2012, demographic characteristics (household size and dependency ratio) 
were the most important variables after education, with an average factor inequality weight of 
around 27 percent in 2002 and later rising to 36 percent in 2012.  As expenditure inequality is 
mostly measured on the basis of the average expenditure of the household members, the 
composition of a household has an impact on income inequality. It has been presumed that 
the less homogeneous4 the household, the higher the consumption inequality, because the 
households of different types have different incomes and expenditures per household member 
(Wilkie, 1996). It is not difficult to infer that poor households have a higher dependency ratio 
(or lower per capita labour input) and thus a lower level of consumption. Usually, the birth 
rate is higher among the families at the bottom of the distribution, making the consumption 
                                                
4 Homogeneity in terms household composition 
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per family member even smaller in this group of population, and increasing the overall 
inequality. Substantial welfare gaps also exist between households from different regions and 
whose members are engaged in different employment activities. These gaps are more visible 
for employment in 2012 and for geographic locations in 2002. Formal sector workers fared 
better in terms of wellbeing than informal sector employees and consequently, contribute 
positively to measured income inequality. 
Turning the attention towards relative factor contributions to the change or increase in total 
inequality from 2002-2012, the largest share was accounted for by an increase in 
demographic inequality. Furthermore, the impact of employment characteristics on total 
inequality has doubled during the 2002-2012 period. Decompositions show that 
demographics accounted for 73 percent of the increase in inequality, while education and 
employment was almost half as important as demographics of the increase in the Gini index. 
According to Figure 7. Regression-based inequality decompositions – 2002 gross differentials in 
welfare explained by spatial and regional characteristics have also fallen between the 2002-
2012 period. Thus, with their factor inequality weights falling, spatial and regional 
differences in inequality have contributed negatively to the increase in total inequality during 
this ten-year period. 
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5.	  Conclusions	  and	  Policy	  Implications	  
 
In this study, we have examined poverty, inequality and pro-poor changes in Indonesia from 
2002 to 2012. During this period, the ordinary growth rate of a household’s income per capita 
was 38 percent. The growth rate varied from ten percent (with an average annual increase of 
one percent) for the poorest decile to 50 percent (average annual increase of five percent) for 
the richest decile, while the rate of pro-poor growth was around 13-15 percent throughout. 
All poverty indicators suggest that economic growth in Indonesia was particularly beneficial 
for those located at the top of the distribution. Indeed, for all the three pro-poor indices and 
estimated GICs, we find that the only positions that grew more than the mean where those 
above the top most quintiles, which suggests that the gains from growth were highly 
concentrated at the top of the income distribution. Indonesia’s growth benefitted mainly to 
the relatively rich households; the poor gained little and often lost from it. Success achieved 
in macroeconomic management, strong domestic demand, growth in working-age population, 
consumer class and private investment have apparently not given Indonesian households 
living near and below the poverty line enough productive employment and economic 
opportunities to decrease their relative deprivation, nor have they fostered a more inclusive 
society. 
Regression-based decompositions also found that education differences in expenditure to 
have contributed substantially (37 percent on average) to overall inequality, suggesting that 
education policies have substantially more redistributive impacts. Decompositions for the 
change in inequality during the 2002-2012 period shows that the largest contribution to 
Indonesia’s rising inequality stems from demographic and employment factors. Most of the 
inequality widening effects that stemmed from these factors has been offset to a certain extent 
by the narrowing disparities among households by spatial and regional characteristics. Market 
reforms, unleashed trade activities, increased factor mobility and successful attempts by the 
Indonesian government to direct resources to the poorer regions can be identified as sources 
of this equalising spatial effect over time. This finding also justifies regional development 
programmes and campaigns.  
Indonesia has been experiencing an increase in the urbanisation rate, driven by rural-urban 
migration, which has important implications for pro-poor growth. A higher share of urban 
population together with increasing urban inequality can be viewed as negative effects of the 
migration process from rural to urban areas. Thus, even though poverty is still relatively more 
prevalent in rural than urban areas, findings from this analysis suggests that policy planner’s 
attention needs to be gradually shifted to the fact that poverty and inequality might become 
increasingly more of an urban phenomenon in time to come. That will mean, inter alia, that 
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policy options need to give increasingly more weight to alleviating the effect of rural-urban 
migration on urban poverty.  
Therefore, better social integration of rural migrants through better-functioning and more 
open labour markets will help minimise the adverse impacts of rural-urban migration. Rural 
migrants’ needs to be provided with market-relevant education and vocational training that 
would enable them to participate in labour markets and partake in the fruits of urban growth, 
without excluding them socially and widening the gap in urban inequality. Furthermore, since 
rural-to-urban migrants are usually engaged in informal employment, policies aimed at 
integrating and linking informal labour with the formal sector will render growth more pro-
poor and inclusive. 
With regard to gender, policies that encourage the participation of women in education and in 
the labour force can produce substantial differences in the distribution of family income and 
welfare. Empowering women can be one of the most effective ways of increasing household 
welfare and community empowerment. Investing in female education and employment will 
further increase the labour force for production and economic growth. It will also indirectly 
aid pro-poor economic growth, for an instance by lowering fertility and population growth 
rates and improving the health and education of the next generation5. 
Other pro-poor policies include improving access to credit and minimising credit market 
failures. This will enable poor households to engage in productive, income-generating 
activities and for many would-be entrepreneurs to escape from the poverty trap. Issuing land 
and property titles will also increase the ability of the poor to obtain credit and make it easier 
for them to sell or borrow against these assets for emergency income. It is also imperative, 
the government of Indonesia launch better-targeted and more innovative social transfer 
programmes aimed at reducing disparities in access to basic education and health. These 
programmes should assist the poor in acquiring the skills that they need to compete in new 
and emerging markets. A classic example is Latin America, where it invested in schools and 
pioneered conditional cash transfers for the very poor, and is now the only region where 
inequality in most countries has fallen. 
In essence, policies increasing school enrolment and achievement, effective family planning 
programmes that reduce the birth rate and dependency load within poor households, 
programmes facilitating urban-rural migration and labour mobility, infrastructure connecting 
leading and lagging regions, and policies granting priorities for specific social groups (such 
as children, elderly, illiterate, informal workers and agricultural households) in targeted 
interventions will serve to simultaneously stem rising inequality and accelerate the pace of 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Indonesia. 
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Figure 1. Annualised Change in Inequality of Expenditure or Income – 1990s and 2000s 
 




Figure 2. Number and Percentage of Poor People in Indonesia 
 




Figure 3. Gini and Expenditure Shares 
 
        Source: Susenas and BPS Data, various years 
 
 
Figure 4a. FGT Curve (alpha=0) 
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Figure 4b. Difference between FGT Curves (alpha=0) 
 
  Source: Susenas and BPS Data, various years 
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Figure 6. Growth Incidence Curve 
 
           Source: Susenas and BPS Data, various years 
 
 
Figure 7. Regression-based Inequality Decompositions 
 
Source: Susenas and BPS Data, various years 
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China 29.8 5.0 47.9 9.6 
Cambodia 53.3 7.5 45.9 6.1 
Indonesia 46.1 8.3 42.8 5.1 
Lao PDR 66.0 7.6 44.8 5.9 
Malaysia 2.3 4.5 51.5 11.3 
Philippines 41.5 6.0 49.7 8.3 
Thailand 4.6 6.7 47.2 7.1 
Vietnam 43.4 7.4 43.4 5.9 
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Table 2. Regional Socio-Economic Indicators: Regional Socio-Economic Indicators 
Province GDP-Share-2011 Gini-2012 Poverty-2012 HDI-2011 
Aceh 1.42 0.32 19.50 72.16 
North Sumatra 5.22 0.33 10.70 74.65 
West Sumatra 1.64 0.36 8.20 74.28 
Riau 6.87 0.40 8.20 76.53 
Jambi 1.05 0.34 8.40 73.30 
South Sumatra 3.02 0.40 13.80 73.42 
Bengkulu 0.35 0.35 17.70 73.40 
Lampung 2.13 0.36 16.20 71.94 
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung 0.50 0.29 5.50 73.37 
Kepulauan Riau 1.33 0.35 7.10 75.78 
Jakarta 16.32 0.42 3.70 77.97 
West Java 14.30 0.41 10.10 72.73 
Central Java 8.28 0.38 15.30 72.94 
Jogjakarta 0.86 0.43 16.00 76.32 
East Java 14.68 0.36 13.40 72.18 
Banten 3.19 0.39 5.90 70.95 
Bali 1.22 0.43 4.20 72.84 
West Nusa Tenggara 0.81 0.35 18.60 66.23 
East Nusa Tenggara 0.52 0.36 20.90 67.75 
West Kalimantan 1.11 0.38 8.20 69.66 
Central Kalimantan 0.82 0.33 6.50 75.06 
South Kalimantan 1.13 0.38 5.10 70.44 
East Kalimantan 6.49 0.36 6.70 76.22 
North Sulawesi 0.69 0.43 8.20 76.54 
Central Sulawesi 0.74 0.40 15.40 71.62 
South Sulawesi 2.28 0.41 10.10 72.14 
Southeast Sulawesi 0.53 0.40 13.70 70.55 
Gorontalo 0.15 0.44 17.30 70.82 
West Sulawesi 0.21 0.31 13.20 70.11 
Maluku 0.16 0.38 21.80 71.87 
North Maluku 0.10 0.34 8.50 69.47 
West Papua 0.60 0.43 28.20 69.65 
Papua 1.27 0.44 31.10 65.36 




Table 3. Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 2002-2012: Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 2002-2012 
 Urban Rural Indonesia 
 2002 2012 % Change 2002 2012 
% 






239611 743302 210 177291 501397 183 204990 621875 203 
PHI (α=0) 14.5 8.8 -39 21.1 15.1 -28 18.2 12.0 -34 
No. of Poor 
People (Mln) 
13.3 10.6 -20 25.1 18.5 -26 38.4 29.1 -24 
Contribution 
to Poverty 
34.6 36.4 5 65.4 63.6 -3 100.0 100.0 0 
PGI (α=1) 2.45 1.40 -43 3.60 2.4 -33 3.08 1.9 -38 
Gini Index 0.33 0.40 21 0.25 0.30 20 0.31 0.39 27 
Atkinson 
Index 
0.09 0.14 56 0.05 0.08 60 0.07 0.12 71 
Theil Index 0.21 0.34 62 0.11 0.20 82 0.17 0.30 76 
MLD Index 0.18 0.27 50 0.10 0.16 60 0.15 0.24 60 
 
 
Table 4. Growth – Redistribution Decompositions, Indonesia 2002-2012 





a 2002 0.1815 0.0309 
2012 0.1196 0.0188 
Change in Poverty -0.0619 -0.0120 
Growth -0.1757 -0.0412 





2002 0.1447 0.0245 
2012 0.0878 0.014 
Change in Poverty -0.0569 -0.0105 
Growth -0.1511 -0.0339 





2002 0.2109 0.0360 
2012 0.1512 0.0236 
Change in Poverty -0.0597 -0.0123 
Growth -0.1658 -0.0386 




Table 5. Pro-Poor Indices for Indonesia, 2002-2012 
 Estimate STE LB UB 
Growth rate(g) 0.3791 0.0138 0.3521 0.4062 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) index 0.0786 0.0065 0.066 0.0913 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) - g -0.3005 0.0139 -0.3277 -0.2733 
Kakwani & Pernia (2000) index 0.4304 0.0256 0.3801 0.4806 
PEGR index 0.1632 0.0123 0.139 0.1874 
PEGR - g -0.216 0.0112 -0.238 -0.194 






















Table 6. Regression-based Inequality Decompositions – 2012 
  𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟. 𝐒𝐭𝐝.𝐄𝐫𝐫. 𝟏𝟎𝟎∗ 𝐒𝐤 𝛀 𝐗𝐤𝐘∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
 








No. males:0-14 -0.188 0.002 14.87
6 
0.005 -0.890 -1.318 -43.091 
No. females:0-14 -0.188 0.003 13.58
8 
0.004 -0.829 -1.362 -44.543 
No. males: 15-64 -0.064 0.003 1.976 0.001 -0.606 -0.661 -21.623 
No. females: 15-65 -0.083 0.003 2.706 0.001 -0.803 -0.585 -19.128 
No. males: 65 above -0.129 0.009 0.662 0.000 -0.092 -3.135 -102.506 
No. females: 65 
above 
-0.171 0.007 1.268 0.000 -0.144 -2.878 -94.126 
Age 0.010 0.001 -0.736 0.000 3.448 0.291 9.530 
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.562 0.000 -1.331 -0.583 -19.074 
Male 0.103 0.010 -0.549 0.000 0.673 0.402 13.149 






Education-SD 0.101 0.005 -2.588 -
0.001 
0.214 1.603 52.408 
Education-SMP 0.206 0.006 -0.591 0.000 0.234 2.382 77.903 
Education-SMA 0.423 0.006 14.33
0 



















Agriculture -0.188 0.006 10.61
2 
0.003 -0.590 -1.190 -38.923 
Mining 0.031 0.014 0.055 0.000 0.005 6.720 219.776 
Electricity/gas/water 0.099 0.036 0.068 0.000 0.002 18.602 608.323 
Construction -0.105 0.009 0.319 0.000 -0.049 -3.897 -127.441 
Trade and restaurant 0.055 0.007 0.814 0.000 0.053 2.613 85.447 
Transport and 
warehouse 
-0.043 0.010 -0.018 0.000 -0.016 -4.473 -146.264 
Self-owned business 
(SOB) 
0.058 0.007 -0.358 0.000 0.099 1.866 61.026 
SOB-non permanent 
worker 
0.057 0.007 -1.758 -
0.001 
0.107 1.737 56.804 
SOB-permanent 
worker 
0.394 0.010 4.147 0.001 0.137 4.565 149.273 
Worker/employee/sta
ff 
0.104 0.006 3.658 0.001 0.215 1.635 53.469 
Spatial Province dummies Yes Yes 8.790 0.003    
 Constant 13.025 0.024      
 Adj R-squared  0.400       
 Number of obs  71138       Note:  S! = cov β!X! , ln(Y)σ! ln(Y) = β!σ X!   cor X!, ln(Y)σ ln(Y) , and  Ω   =   S! ∗ Coefficient  of  variation  ln(Y). 
 
Table 7. Regression-based Inequality Decompositions – 2002 
40 
  𝐂𝐨𝐞𝐟𝐟. 𝐒𝐭𝐝.𝐄𝐫𝐫. 𝟏𝟎𝟎∗ 𝐒𝐤 𝛀 𝐗𝐤𝐘∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
 








No. males:0-14 -0.148 0.005 12.165 0.004 -0.775 -1.289 -45.116 
No. females:0-14 -0.139 0.006 9.780 0.003 -0.675 -1.331 -46.580 
No. males: 15-64 -0.053 0.006 1.167 0.000 -0.551 -0.673 -23.549 
No. females: 15-65 -0.046 0.006 0.651 0.000 -0.494 -0.597 -20.908 
No. males: 65 above -0.096 0.020 0.551 0.000 -0.068 -3.274 -114.607 
No. females: 65 above -0.138 0.016 1.071 0.000 -0.117 -3.034 -106.211 
Age 0.005 0.002 -1.945 -0.001 1.886 0.315 11.017 
Age-squared 0.000 0.000 1.066 0.000 -0.646 -0.628 -21.991 
Male 0.126 0.022 -0.931 0.000 0.897 0.390 13.668 






Education-SD 0.088 0.011 -2.318 -0.001 0.219 1.517 53.108 
Education-SMP 0.238 0.015 2.793 0.001 0.250 2.614 91.505 
Education-SMA 0.380 0.014 16.157 0.005 0.562 2.137 74.800 
Education-Grad/Post 
Grad 














Agriculture -0.130 0.013 8.553 0.002 -0.439 -1.201 -42.029 
Mining 0.033 0.039 0.043 0.000 0.003 8.980 314.373 
Electricity/gas/water -0.019 0.096 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -23.113 -809.133 
Construction -0.058 0.021 0.099 0.000 -0.023 -4.426 -154.926 
Trade and restaurant 0.034 0.015 0.485 0.000 0.039 2.458 86.052 
Transport and 
warehouse 
0.011 0.020 0.047 0.000 0.005 3.966 138.823 
Self-owned business 
(SOB) 
0.008 0.015 -0.065 0.000 0.015 1.796 62.870 
SOB-non-permanent 
worker 
0.036 0.016 -1.293 0.000 0.078 1.659 58.084 
SOB-permanent 
worker 
0.222 0.024 1.648 0.001 0.077 4.768 166.897 
Worker/employee/ 
staff 
-0.008 0.014 -0.282 0.000 -0.020 -1.568 -54.883 
Spatial Province dummies Yes Yes 26.900 0.008    
 Constant 11.886 0.058      
 Adj R-squared  0.420       







Table A1. Growth – Redistribution Decompositions, Indonesia 2006-2012 
 
 
Table A2. Pro-Poor Indices for Indonesia, 2006-2012 
  Estimate STE LB UB 
Growth rate(g) 0.265 0.019 0.227 0.303 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) index 0.136 0.008 0.119 0.152 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) - g -0.130 0.020 -0.169 -0.090 
Kakwani & Pernia (2000) index 0.565 0.040 0.486 0.645 
PEGR index 0.150 0.014 0.123 0.177 
PEGR - g -0.115 0.015 -0.145 -0.086 
     
STD: standard error, LB: lower bound of 95% confidence interval, UB: upper bound of 95% confidence interval 





a 2006 0.1776 0.0372 
2012 0.1196 0.0188 
Change in Poverty -0.0579 -0.0184 
Growth  -0.1245 -0.0295 




 2006 0.1347 0.0276 
2012 0.0878 0.014 
Change in Poverty -0.0469 -0.0136 
Growth  -0.1033 -0.0238 




 2006 0.2181 0.0463 2012 0.1512 0.0236 
Change in Poverty -0.0669 -0.0227 
Growth  -0.1305 -0.0311 
Redistribution 0.0636 0.0084 
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